First Amendment--The Right of Access to Criminal Trials Extended by Burrows, Karen B.
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
Volume 73
Issue 4 Winter Article 3
Winter 1982
First Amendment--The Right of Access to Criminal
Trials Extended
Karen B. Burrows
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminology Commons, and the Criminology and Criminal
Justice Commons
This Supreme Court Review is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly
Commons.
Recommended Citation
Karen B. Burrows, First Amendment--The Right of Access to Criminal Trials Extended, 73 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1388 (1982)
0091-4169/82/7304-1388
TIIEJOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW &CRIMINOLOGY Vol. 73, No. 4
Copyright © 1983 by Northwestern University School of Law trintedin U.S.A.
FIRST AMENDMENT-THE RIGHT OF
ACCESS TO CRIMINAL TRIALS
EXTENDED.
Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 102 S. Ct. 2613
(1982).
In Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court,' the Supreme Court reaf-
firmed the public's first amendment right of access to criminal trials,
first established two years before in Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia.2
Five Justices joined Justice Brennan in overturning a Massachusetts
statute which required that the public be excluded from the courtroom
during the testimony of a minor victim in a sex-offense trial. 3 Although
the state's purpose of protecting minor victims of sex crimes was held to
be compelling, the Court found this interest did not justify a mandatory
closure law. Instead, the Court held that a state which is concerned for
the welfare of the minor should determine on a case-by-case basis
whether circumstances necessitate closure.4
The Globe Newspaper Court, however, failed to identify the circum-
stances in which exclusion of the public from the trial would be proper,
and it was similarly unclear about any possible extension of the public's
right of access beyond the criminal trial context. Nevertheless, the opin-
ion is valuable because Justice Brennan's functional analysis of the first
amendment right of access, which he first articulated in Richmond News-
papers, received the support of a majority of the Justices. Justice Bren-
nan's analysis may become the basis for broader rights of public access
in the future.
I. PROCEDURAL AND PRECEDENTIAL HISTORY OF GLOBE
NEWSPAPER
Globe Newspaper Company initiated this suit after it was denied
access to a rape trial in the Superior Court for the County of Norfolk,
1 102 S. Ct. 2613 (1982).
2 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
3 Justices White, Marshall, Blackmun, and Powell joined Justice Brennan's opinion. Jus-
tice O'Connor concurred in the judgment.
4 Globe Newspaper, 102 S. Ct. at 2621.
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Commonwealth of Massachusetts. 5 The three complaining witnesses
who accused the defendant of forcible rape and forced unnatural rape
were minors: two of them were sixteen and the other seventeen years old
at the time of the trial.6 When the hearings on preliminary motions
began, the presiding judge, acting on his own initiative, ordered the pro-
ceedings closed to the public and press, pursuant to a Massachusetts
statute.7 Before the trial began, Globe moved that the court revoke the
closure order, hold hearings before issuing similar future orders, and per-
mit Globe to intervene "for the limited purpose of asserting its rights to
access to both the trial and hearings on related preliminary motions.",,
The trial judge denied Globe's motion.
Globe immediately sought injunctive relief from a single justice of
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. 9 At the hearing before
the justice, the Commonwealth did not argue for a closed trial, but
rather waived any rights it might have had to exclude the press.' 0 The
justice nevertheless denied Globe's request to attend the trial and re-
lated proceedings." Before Globe appealed to the full court, the rape
trial proceeded and the defendant was acquitted.' 2
When Globe's appeal was heard by the full Supreme Judicial
Court, it held that the case was moot because the rape trial had already
concluded.13 However, the court decided to reach the merits because
the closure issue was "capable of repetition, yet evading review,"1 4 and
held that the statute mandated closure only during the testimony of mi-
nor complainants. According to the court, requests to exclude the pub-
5 Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 379 Mass. 846, 401 N.E.2d 360 (1980). The
rape trial was Commonwealth v. Albert Aladjem, No. 73102-9 (Norfolk Super. Ct. May 10,
1979).
6 Globe Newspaper, 379 Mass. at 848-49, 401 N.E.2d at 363.
7 MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 278, § 16A (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1980) provides in part:
At the trial of a complaint or indictment for rape, incest, carnal abuse or other crime
involving sex, where a minor under eighteen years of age is the person upon, with or
against whom the crime is alleged to have been committed. . the presiding justice shall
exclude the general public from the court room, admitting only such persons as may
have a direct interest in the case.
8 Globe Newspaper, 102 S. Ct. at 2616.
9 Id. Globe's request was contained in a petition for extraordinary relief filed pursuant to
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 211, § 3 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1980).
10 102 S. Ct. at 2616.
11 The justice's decision was unreported.
12 102 S. Ct. at 2616-17.
13 Globe Newspaper, 379 Mass. at 847, 401 N.E.2d at 362.
14 Id. at 848, 401 N.E.2d at 362. The "capable of repetition, yet evading review" doctrine,
which originated in Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 219
U.S. 498, 515 (1911), is a well-established exception to the mootness doctrine. Under this
exception, a moot case will be adjudicated if the contested issue is likely to reappear and the
parties would not have sufficient time to argue the case before the issue became moot. See
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125 (1973).
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lic from other segments of the trial are within the discretion of the trial
judge, after the judge holds a hearing at which any person to be ex-
cluded can be heard.15
Globe then appealed to the United States Supreme Court. How-
ever, in light of its decision in Richmond Newspapers, announced after the
decision of the full Massachusetts court, the Court vacated the judgment
of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, and remanded the case
for further consideration.' 6
In Richmond Newspapers, the Court held that a state trial judge's or-
der closing a murder trial to the public at the request of the accused
violated the first and fourteenth amendments.1 7 Seven Justices agreed
that the first amendment embodies a constitutional right of access to
criminal trials.' 8 The rationale for this conclusion, however, was dis-
puted. Chief Justice Burger, writing a plurality opinion in which two
other Justices joined, based his analysis on the history of open trials in
the United States and England.19 After an extensive review of the his-
tory of the jury trial from the time of the Norman Conquest through the
American Colonial period,20 the Chief Justice noted that the underlying
reason for the historic openness of trials was that an open courtroom
helped ensure the proper functioning of the trial; openness "gave assur-
ance that the proceedings were conducted fairly to all concerned, and it
discouraged perjury, the misconduct of participants, and decisions based
on secret bias or partiality.' Chief Justice Burger also suggested that
open trials have a therapeutic effect on the community by providing an
outlet for community concern, hostility and emotion.2 2 He concluded
that since criminal trials have been traditionally open, for reasons that
are as valid today as they were centuries ago, the first amendment pro-
hibits the summary closing of courtroom doors.23 "Absent an overriding
interest articulated in findings, the trial of a criminal case must be open
to the public. '24
Justice Brennan, on the other hand, wrote a concurring opinion,
15 379 Mass. at 865, 401 N.E.2d at 372.
16 449 U.S. 894 (1980).
17 Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 580-81.
18 See id. at 558-81 (plurality opinion written by Burger, C.J., and joined by Justices
White and Stevens); Id. at 584-98 (Brennan, J., concurring, joined by Justice Marshall); Id. at
598-601 (Stewart, J., concurring); Id. at 601-04 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
19 Id. at 575.
20 Id. at 564-68.
21 Id. at 569.
22 Id. at 571. The ChiefJustice explained that unless the public is aware of processes that
are underway to punish criminal conduct, natural human reactions of outrage could manifest
themselves in some form of vengeful self-help.
23 Id. at 576.
24 Id. at 581.
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joined by Justice Marshall, in which he argued history is only one con-
sideration in determining whether the public has a right of access to
governmental information. 25 His opinion stressed the functional aspect
of the press as the institution which disseminates information: "[t]he
first amendment embodies more than a commitment to free expression
and communicative interchange for their own sakes; it has a structural
role to play in securing and fostering our republican system of self-gov-
ernment. '26 According to Justice Brennan, because public debate must
be informed to ensure that a democracy functions effectively, the first
amendment protects not only communication itself, but also the condi-
tions necessary for meaningful communication.27 Therefore, since pub-
lic access to criminal trials is important to the proper functioning of the
judicial process and the government as a whole,28 he reasoned that the
first amendment protects the openness of criminal trials. 2 9
When the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts faced the case
on remand, it adopted Chief Justice Burger's reasoning and decided
that Richmond Newspapers applied only to trials historically open to the
25 Id. at 585-89.
26 Id. at 587.
27 Id. at 588.
28 Justice Brennan explained that openness was important to the judicial process because
open trials assure the public that procedural rights are respected, and that justice is afforded
equally to all. "Publicity serves . . . to assure the criminal defendant a fair and accurate
adjudication of guilt or innocence." Id. at 593. Moreover, because "judges are not mere
umpires, but, in their own sphere, lawmakers-a coordinate branch of government," id. at 595,
what serves the judiciary also serves the government.
29 Id. at 597-98. Because Justice Brennan recognized that extending first amendment pro-
tection to all "the indispensable conditions of meaningful communication" could include vir-
tually anything, he limited the protection by weighing it against "the opposing interests
invaded." Id. at 588. He offered two considerations which he believed helpful in the balanc-
ing process: whether the particular proceeding or information was traditionally open to the
public, and what importance public access has to the process itself. Id. at 589. Applying
these principles to the case at hand, Justice Brennan found that criminal trials have a history
of openness and that access is important to the functioning of the judicial process; therefore,
the first amendment protects the openness of criminal trials. Id. at 597-98.
There were several other opinions filed in Richmond Newspapers. Justice White filed a
separate concurrence noting that the decision would have been unnecessary had the Court
followed his view in Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979), that the sixth amend-
ment forbids exclusion of the public from criminal proceedings. Id. at 581-82. Justice Stevens
filed a separate concurrence in which he emphasized the importance of the Court's decision.
"Today,. . . for the first time, the Court unequivocally holds that an arbitrary interference
with access to important information is an abridgment of the freedoms of speech and of the
press protected by the first amendment." Id. at 583. Justice Stevens indicated he would ex-
tend Richmond Newspapers to hold that the first amendment protects the public and press from
abridgment of their rights of access to information about the operation of any branch of the
government. Id. at 584. Justice Blackmun filed a separate concurrence to emphasize his
belief that the right to a public trial can be found in the sixth amendment, as well as the first
amendment. Id. at 601-04. Justice Rehnquist dissented, stating that neither the first nor the
sixth amendment requires public access to a trial. Id. at 604-06.
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public.30 Since rape trials involving testimony of minors were not tradi-
tionally open,31 the Massachusetts court held that Richmond Newspapers
did not dictate a reversal of its previous ruling.32 The court also empha-
sized that the mandatory nature of the statute's closure rule was neces-
sary to further the state interests which underlie the statute. Those
interests include encouraging minor victims to come forward to report
their complaints and give testimony, protecting minor victims of sex
crimes from psychological damage or public degradation and enhanc-
ing the likelihood of credible testimony from such minors, free of confu-
sion or embellishment.3 3 According to the court, these interests would
be defeated if each trial judge had to make a case-by-case determination
of whether the courtroom should be closed during a minor's testimony.
To make such a decision, the judge would require a detailed psychologi-
cal examination of the minor, and the court feared such an in-depth
examination would force the victim to relive the experience 4 "Given
the statute's narrow scope in an area of traditional sensitivity to the
needs of victims," 35 the court held that the statute's mandatory-closure
requirement was constitutional, and accordingly it dismissed Globe's
appeal. 36
II. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION IN GLOBE NEWSPAPER
The United States Supreme Court reversed the decision of the
30 Globe Newspaper, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. -, 423 N.E.2d 773 (1981).
31 There is at least one notable exception to this history [of open criminal trials]. In
cases involving sexual assaults, portions of trials have been closed to some segments of the
public, even when the victim was an adult (citation omitted).
1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at -, 423 N.E.2d at 778. After citing a group of cases in which courts
have sustained closure orders, the court stated, "Whatever the disagreement among the courts
about specific closure orders, it is clear that the majority of the courts have upheld decisions
to close parts of trials when a minor victim of a sexual assault is testifying." Id. at -, 423
N.E.2d at 779.
32 Id. at -, 423 N.E.2d at 781.
33 Id. at -, 423 N.E.2d at 779. The court also noted that the statute promoted the state's
interest in securing the sound and orderly administration of justice, preserving evidence and
obtaining just convictions.
34 Ascertaining the susceptibility of an individual victim might require expert testi-
mony and would be a cumbersome process at best. Only the most exceptional minor
would be sanguine about the possibility that the details of an attack may become public.
An examiner would have to distinguish between natural hesitancy and cases of particu-
lar vulnerability. To the extent that such a hearing is effective, requiring various psycho-
logical examinations in some depth, the victim will be forced to relive the experience. So
too, the families of youthful victims will be uncertain whether the reporting of a sexual
assault will expose a child to additional trauma caused by the preliminary hearing as
well as to public testimony at the trial.
Id. at -, 423 N.E.2d at 779-80.
35 Id. at -, 423 N.E.2d at 781.
36 Id.
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Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. 3 7 It held that the statute
which mandated closure of a portion of a criminal trial unconstitution-
ally violated the public's first amendment right of access to criminal tri-
als. 38 The different approaches taken by Justice Brennan in his majority
opinion and Chief Justice Burger in his dissent are of particular interest;
although their analytical approaches led to the same result in Richmond
Newspapers, the Justices reached diametrically opposed conclusions in
Globe Newspaper.
Justice Brennan re-articulated his view that the first amendment
was intended primarily to assure freedom of communication on matters
relating to the functioning of government.3 9 By protecting this class of
speech, the amendment ensures each citizen the right to participate in
our republican system of self-government. 40 He noted that the first
amendment is "broad enough to encompass those rights that, while not
unambiguously enumerated in the very terms of the amendment, are
nonetheless necessary to the enjoyment of other first amendment
rights."4 1
As in his Richmond Newspapers opinion, Justice Brennan identified
two features of criminal trials which explain why access to criminal tri-
als is properly afforded constitutional protection. First, criminal trials
have historically been open to the public, and second, such openness is
important to the proper functioning of the trial itself.42 Justice Brennan
did not, however, hold that these two features must both be present
before the Court will recognize a first amendment right of access. Al-
though he alluded to the importance of a tradition of openness in Globe
Newspaper, one can draw an inference that Justice Brennan considers
historical practice to be of secondary importance in light of his opinion,
which disregards Chief Justice Burger's observation that criminal trials
have not traditionally been open during the testimony of minor sex vic-
tims. In fact, Justice Brennan openly disparaged the historical argu-
ment when he stated: "[w]hether the first amendment right of access to
criminal trials can be restricted in the context of any particular criminal
trial. . . depends not on the historical openness of that type of criminal
trial but rather on the state interests assertedly supporting the restric-
tion."' 43 It appears, therefore, that the majority was less concerned
about the tradition of openness of criminal trials as an indicator of
37 Globe Newspaper, 102 S. Ct. 2613.
38 Id. at 2622.
39 Id. at 2619. ChiefJustice Burger filed a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Rehnquist.
Justice Stevens wrote a separate dissent.
4 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 2619-20. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
43 Id. at 2619-20 n.13.
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whether a public right of access exists than it was about whether the
state's interest in closing the trial were compelling enough to outweigh
the value of allowing public access.
In order to determine whether the state's interest outweighs the first
amendment value of public access, Justice Brennan concluded that any
court which reviews restriction of the public's access to a criminal trial
must apply exacting scrutiny: "[w]here, as in the present case, the State
attempts to deny the right of access in order to inhibit the disclosure of
sensitive information, it must be shown that the denial is necessitated by
a compelling governmental interest, and is narrowly tailored to serve
that interest. ' 44 In applying this test to the instant case, Justice Bren-
nan began by examining the two interests which the state asserted were
compelling: the protection of minor victims from further trauma and
embarrassment, and the encouragement of such victims to come for-
ward and testify in a truthful and credible manner.45 The Court held
that the latter interest was not compelling because the Commonwealth
offered no empirical evidence to support the claim that the closure rule
actually caused more victims to report crimes.46  The Court also
doubted the state's asserted interest as a matter of common sense.47 Ac-
cording to the Court, if the Commonwealth was trying to encourage
minor victims to come forward by keeping such matters secret, the stat-
ute's failure to bar access to both the transcript of the victim's testimony
and to court personnel present during the victim's testimony gravely un-
dermined the efficacy of the closure rule.48
The Court did rule, however, that the state's interest in safeguard-
ing the physical and psychological well-being of a minor victim was
compelling. 49 But, under the analysis employed by Justice Brennan, the
statute was nevertheless unconstitutional because it was not narrowly
44 Id. at 2620.
45 Id. at 2620-21.
46 Id. at 2622.
47 I. The Court stated, "[n]ot only is the claim speculative in empirical terms, but it is
also open to serious question as a matter of logic and common sense." Id.
48 Id. Justice Brennan further stated that even if the statute was shown to advance the
state's interest in encouraging the reporting of crime, the interest would probably not be
deemed compelling "[flor that same interest could be relied on to support an array of
mandatory-closure rules designed to encourage victims to come forward." Id. In other words,
because there are many crimes in which victims may be reluctant to come forward and tes-
tify, the statute which protects only victims of sex crimes is under-inclusive.
49 Id. at 2621. The Court did not explain this ruling, probably because the importance of
this interest is well-established. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168 (1944), where
the Court stated, "[a] democratic society rests, for its continuance, upon the healthy, well-
rounded growth of young people into full maturity as citizens, with all that implies. It may
secure this against impeding restraints and dangers within a broad range of selection." See
also New York v. Ferber, 102 S. Ct. 3348, 3354 (1982).
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tailored to serve that interest. 50 The Court reasoned that some minor
victims would not be adversely affected by allowing public access to the
courtroom during their testimony and, therefore, the mandatory closure
rule unduly infringed upon the public's first amendment rights.51 The
Court thus held that trial judges must hold a hearing and weigh the
circumstances of each case before deciding whether to close the court-
room when a minor victim of a sex crime is testifying.52
Chief Justice Burger filed a strong dissent, joined by Justice Rehn-
quist, in which he applied the same historical analysis he used in Rich-
mondNewspapers. In Richmond Newspapers, the Chief Justice recognized a
first amendment "'right of access to places traditionally open to the
public.'-53 In Globe Newspaper, however, he concluded that the first
amendment does not require an open courtroom when a minor victim of
a sex crime is testifying because that type of case does not have a tradi-
tion of openness.5 4
Chief Justice Burger further argued that even if Richmond Newspa-
pers required that the public have access to the testimony of minor vic-
tims of sex crimes, that right was not infringed in Globe Newspaper since
50 102 S. Ct. at 2621.
51 Id.
52 Id. Justice O'Connor concurred in judgment, using elements of both the majority and
dissenting opinions to reach her conclusion. Id. at 2623. She agreed with Justice Brennan's
ruling that the statute violated the first amendment because Massachusetts had not demon-
strated an interest weighty enough to justify a mandatory closure order. But she supported
Justice Brennan only in the criminal trial context, otherwise agreeing with Chief Justice Bur-
ger that the first amendment right of access is limited to proceedings with a long history of
openness. "Richmond Newspapers rests upon our long history of open criminal trials and the
special value, for both public and accused, of that openness." Id. Because Globe Newspaper
did concern a criminal trial, Justice O'Connor agreed with the majority that exacting scru-
tiny should be applied to the Massachusetts statute, but she disagreed with Justice Brennan's
broad rule that the first amendment protects every right that is "'necessary to the enjoyment
of other First Amendment rights."' Id.
53 Id. at 2624 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Richmond Newspapers , 448 U.S. at 577).
54 102 S. Ct. at 2624. The Chief Justice stated:
Today Justice Brennan ignores the weight of historical practice. There is clearly a
long history of exclusion of the public from trials involving sexual assaults, particularly
those against minors ...
Absent such a history of openness, the positions of the Justices joining reversal in
Richmond Newspapers gives no support to the proposition that closure of the proceedings
during the testimony of the minor victim violates the First Amendment.
In support of his assertion that trials have not been open historically, Chief Justice Bur-
ger cited cases in which the courtrooms of sex trials were closed: Harris v. Stephens, 361 F.2d
888 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 964 (1967); Reagan v. United States, 202 F. 488 (9th
Cir. 1913); United States v. Geise, 158 F. Supp. 821 (D. Alaska), aJ'd, 262 F.2d 151 (9th Cir.
1958), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 842 (1959); Hogan v. State, 191 Ark. 437, 86 S.W.2d 931 (1935);
State v. Purvis, 157 Conn. 198, 251 A.2d 178 (1968), cert denied, 395 U.S. 928 (1969); Moore v.
State, 151 Ga. 648, 108 S.E. 47 (192 1),appeal dismissed, 260 U.S. 702 (1922). See also Stami-
carbon, N.V. v. American Cyanamid Co., 506 F.2d 532, 539-40 (2d Cir. 1974), and cases cited
therein.
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the Massachusetts statute allowed the press access to the trial transcript
and placed no restrictions on other sources of information about the vic-
tim's testimony.55 Because neither the purpose nor the primary effect of
the law was to infringe upon the exchange of information, Chief Justice
Burger argued that Richmond Newspapers merely required the Court to
examine whether the interests of the state outweighed the effect on first
amendment rights.56 The Chief Justice proceeded to balance the stat-
ute's goal of combatting the problem of the under-reporting of sex
crimes against its "very limited incidental effects,"' 57 on the freedoms of
speech and press, and concluded that Massachusett's statute was
constitutional.5 8
III. THE PHILOSOPHICAL DEBATE
In Globe Newspaper, the Supreme Court rejected Chief Justice Bur-
ger's restrictive interpretation of the first amendment which extended a
constitutional right of access only to those places traditionally open to
the public. Instead, a majority of the Court adopted Justice Brennan's
broader framework which focuses on the function of the first amend-
ment in a democratic society. Upon examining Chief Justice Burger
and Justice Brennan's analyses in turn, it is evident that the latter's the-
ory is more consistent with Supreme Court precedent and the underly-
ing purposes of the first amendment.
A. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER'S ANALYSIS
Chief Justice Burger attempted to restrict the range of the first
amendment right of access to cover only situations that have been so
consistently open in the past as to carry a presumption of openness to-
55 Globe Newspaper, 102 S. Ct. at 2624. Additional sources include court officials, attorneys
and others present during the testimony.
56 See infia text accompanying notes 63-80 for a discussion of the correct standards to
apply to evaluate state action that infringes on speech activity in public places.
57 102 S. Ct. at 2625.
58 Justice Stevens also filed a dissent, in which he argued that the Court should not have
invoked jurisdiction of the case. Id. at 2627-28 (Stevens, J., dissenting). He argued that this
case was moot and did not fall within the "capable of repetition, yet evading review" excep-
tion because the statute in question, as construed by the Supreme Court of the state, had
never actually been applied to a live controversy. Since the new interpretation of the statute
had never been employed by a trial court and since the first amendment right of access to
newsworthy material had only recently been recognized he noted that there was a special
importance in deciding the case only upon a set of concrete facts:
Only in specific controversies can the Court decide how this right of access to crimi-
nal trials can be accommodated with other societal interests, such as the protection of
victims or defendants. . ..
ITihe Court's comment on the First Amendment issues implicated by the Massa-
chusetts statute [was] advisory, hypothetical, and at best, premature. . ..
Id. at 2628-29.
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day.59 A close reading of Chief Justice Burger's opinion in Richmond
Newspapers demonstrates that he was not arguing that the first amend-
ment grants any affirmative rights of access to government information
or proceedings. Rather, the Chief Justice was attempting to preserve
the "unbroken, uncontradicted history" of open trials in this country.6 0
In commenting on the Richmond Newspapers case, Professor Archibald
Cox noted, "[c]losing the door of a courtroom that has always been open
can be realistically viewed as interference with observation and public
reporting rather than as preservation of the confidentiality of. . .offi-
cial business. . . . [T]his is the gist of the decision [in Richmond
Newspapers]."61
As Cox suggested, in Richmond Newspapers the Chief Justice trans-
formed the traditional openness of criminal trials into a circumstance
the first amendment protects by citing a previous statement the Court
made: "'[t]he first amendment goes beyond protection of the press and
the self-expression of individuals to prohibit government from limiting
the stock of information from which members of the public may
draw.' "62 In other words, the first amendment does not permit the gov-
ernment to limit the public's access to information it has traditionally
been privy to.
To support his reasoning, Chief Justice Burger drew an analogy
between public forums and criminal trials. The Supreme Court has
often held that streets, sidewalks and parks are "public forums" -
places which are open to the public where people may express them-
selves through speeches, demonstrations, parades and the like, under the
protection of the first amendment. 63 In Richmond Newspapers, Chief Jus-
tice Burger compared these traditional public forums to courtrooms,
where the public has also historically had the right to be present.64
59 Id. at 2624.
60 Id.
61 Cox, The Supreme Court, 1979 Term-Foreword." Freedom of Expression in the Burger Court, 94
HARV. L. REv. 1, 22-23 (1980). Cox supported his statement by quoting a sentence from
Chief Justice Burger's opinion in Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 576: "[t]he First Amend-
ment guarantees of speech and press, standing alone, prohibit government from summarily
closing courtroom doors which had long been open to the public at the time that amendment
was adopted."
62 Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 5 75-76, quoting First National Bank of Boston v. Bel-
lotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978). This quotation was taken somewhat out of context-the Bel-
lotti Court held that the first amendment secures the right of a banking corporation to spend
money for political advertising, and did not discuss the public's right to information supplied
by the government. See Cox, supra note 61 at 22.
63 For the history of the public forum doctrine, see generally B. SCHMIDT, FREEDOM OF
THE PRESS VS. PUBLIC ACCESS 87-100 (1976); Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v.
Louisiana, 1965 SuP. CT. REv. 1, 11-12; Karst, Public Enterprise and the Public Forum: A Comment
on Southeastern Promotions, Ltd u. Conrad, 37 OHIO ST. L.J. 247, 248-52 (1976).
64 Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 578.
1982] 1397
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
However, while the analogy between the courtroom and the public
forum is an apt one, the Chief Justice's application of the historical ar-
gument in Globe Newspaper cannot draw support from those cases be-
cause in Globe he sought unduly to restrict the class of places that should
be considered public forums. An examination of the public forum cases
demonstrates that the Court was not concerned exclusively in those
cases with a tradition of openness, but rather it concentrated on the role
of the public forum in the exchange of ideas.
The concept of the public forum was first introduced by Justice
Roberts in Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organiation. 65 A passage from
Justice Roberts' opinion has become the accepted statement of the pub-
lic forum concept:
Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially
been held in trust for use of the public and, time out of mind, have been
used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens,
and discussing public questions. Such use of the streets and public places
has, from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights,
and liberties of citizens.66
Another early public forum case which helped define the doctrine was
Martin v. Struthers.67 In that case, the Supreme Court invalidated a stat-
ute which prohibited any person distributing handbills from ringing
doorbells or otherwise summoning residents to the door to receive the
literature. The opening sentence of the opinion declared, "[f]or centu-
ries it has been a common practice in this and other countries for per-
sons not specifically invited to go from home to home and knock on
doors or ring doorbells to communicate ideas to the occupants or to in-
vite them to political, religious, or other kinds of public meetings."
But the Court did not base its holding on history; rather it looked to the
purpose of the first amendment. It said the founding fathers wanted to
protect new and unconventional ideas; therefore, the first amendment
covers both the right to distribute literature and the right to receive it.69
The Court then discussed the widespread use of door-to-door distribu-
tion of circulars, and noted that this method of communication was par-
ticularly important to less wealthy individuals. 70 It is clear, therefore,
that the Court considered not only historical practice, but the value that
practice had in maintaining a system of free expression.
In the mid-1960's, the Supreme Court extended the rights to use
65 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
66 Id. at 515. See also Cass, First Amendment Access to Government Facilities, 65 VA. L. REV.
1287, 1289 (1979).
67 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
68 Id. at 141.
69 Id. at 143.
70 Id. at 146.
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public property for free expression beyond sidewalks, parks and door-
steps to include statehouse grounds in Edwards v. South Carolina.71 In
holding that a student rally at the state capitol was constitutionally pro-
tected, the Court relied on both the traditional right under the Constitu-
tion to express grievances to fellow citizens and legislators, and the
important purpose such speech serves in our system of government. 72
Even when the Court has refused to extend the public forum doc-
trine, it has not relied upon an historical argument; instead, its decisions
have been based upon the incompatibility of the expression with the
normal functioning of the forum. In Adderleq v. Florida,73 the Court held
that the public can be restrained from picketing on jailhouse grounds.
The Court distinguished Edwards by noting that, traditionally, state
capitol grounds are open to the public, while jails, built for security pur-
poses, are not.74 This does not mean that because jails have tradition-
ally been closed to the public, there is no right of access to jail grounds.
Rather, the Court considered the main purpose of the facility-secur-
ity-to be incompatible with public demonstrations, so it permitted re-
strictions on speech in that particular place.75
The Supreme Court also upheld a statute which disallowed picket-
ing on courthouse grounds in Cox v. Louisiana.76 In explaining its ruling,
the Court said that the legislature has the right to determine that some
judges will be consciously or unconsciously influenced by demonstra-
tions in or near their courtrooms. The Court did not consider whether
courthouse grounds have been open for demonstrations historically, but
rather focused on the fact that proper functioning of the courts is basic
to our democracy. 77
As the public forum cases illustrate, the Supreme Court has en-
forced a first amendment right to conduct speech-related activity in cer-
tain public places because of the importance of these forums to the
proper functioning of the exchange of ideas, provided the expressive ac-
tivities do not interfere with the important operations of those places.
71 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
72 Id. at 235, 238. Quoting Chief Justice Hughes in Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S.
359, 369 (1931), the Court stated:
The maintenance of the opportunity for free political discussion to the end that govern-
ment may be responsive to the will of the people and that changes may be obtained by
lawful means, an opportunity essential to the security of the Republic, is a fundamental
principal of our constitutional system.
73 385 U.S. 39 (1966).
74 Id. at 41.
75 Similar reasoning was applied in Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
The Court stated, "ft]he crucial question is whether the manner of expression is basically
incompatible with the normal activity of a particular place at a particular time." Id. at 116.
76 379 U.S. 559 (1965).
77 Id. at 562.
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Yet Chief Justice Burger has attempted to modify the public forum doc-
trine by limiting the class of protected public forums to those places
traditionally open to the public. 78 The Chief Justice has simply failed to
acknowledge that the Court did not recognize the right to communicate
in these "public forums" simply because these places were open to the
public at the time the Constitution was written, but because freedom to
communicate is "important to the preservations of the freedoms trea-
sured in a democratic society,"' 79 and essential to " 'the security of the
Republic.' "80
B. JUSTICE BRENNAN'S ANALYSIS
By adopting Justice Brennan's approach in Globe Newspaper, the
Supreme Court embraced the notion that the public must have access to
information in order effectively to maintain a stable self-government.
Justice Brennan explained that the basis for the first amendment right
of access to criminal trials is the understanding that a major purpose of
the first amendment is to protect the free discussion of political issues.8 '
Thus, Justice Brennan adopted the democratic process model of the first
amendment that is commonly associated with Alexander Meiklejohn . 2
The democratic process model declares that the purpose of the first
78 The Chief Justice's narrow view of the public's right of access to governmental informa-
tion is also evident in Houchins v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1 (1978), in which several journalists sued
for the right to inspect and take pictures of a county jail. Chief Justice Burger, writing a
plurality opinion, stated that the first amendment does not compel government to supply
information to the public. Id. at 11. The Chief Justice recognized that jails and prisons are
matters of great public importance, and that with greater information, the public can form
opinions more intelligently about prison conditions. Id. at 8. However, he did not believe
this meant that the right to prison information falls within the first amendment:
The public importance of conditions in penal facilities and the media's role of pro-
viding information afford no basis for reading into the Constitution a right of the public
or the media to enter these institutions, with camera equipment, and take moving and
still pictures of inmates for broadcast purposes. This Court has never intimated a First
Amendment guarantee of a right of access to all sources of information within govern-
ment control.
Id. at 9.
79 379 U.S. at 574.
80 Addertey, 385 U.S. at 55 (quoting De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365 (1937)).
81 Underlying the First Amendment right of access to criminal trials is the common
understanding that "a major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free discus-
sion of governmental affairs," (citation omitted). By offering such protection, the First
Amendment serves to ensure that the individual citizen can effectively participate in and
contribute to our republican system of self-government.
Globe Newspaper, 102 S. Ct. at 2619.
82 See A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITs RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948).
Meiklejohn believed:
The principle of the freedom of speech springs from the necessities of the program of self-
government. It is not a Law of Nature or of Reason in the abstract. It is a deduction
from the basic American agreement that public issues shall be decided by universal
suffrage.
Id. at 26-27.
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amendment is to serve as a tool of democracy in promoting an informed
citizenry.83 This is not the first time the Supreme Court has invoked this
model.8 4 For example, in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 5 the Supreme
Court extended special protection to the discussion of public issues by
holding that the press would not be liable for defaming public officials
unless it could be proved that the libelous material was printed with
actual malice.86 In making its decision, the Court relied upon the need
for debate about public questions, the very need which led to the crea-
tion of the first amendment. "[W]e consider this case against the back-
ground of a profound national commitment to the principle that debate
on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that
it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly
sharp attacks on government and public officials." '8 7
Justice Brennan's analytical approach allowed him to treat the is-
sues in Globe Newspaper and Richmond Newspapers in a flexible manner.
Since he emphasized the importance of the first amendment to a system
of self-government instead of the public's historical access to the court-
room, he was able to analyze the circumstances of the cases and the
needs of modern society in making his decision. Unlike Chief Justice
Burger, Justice Brennan sought to allow the first amendment to con-
tinue its effective functioning by adapting it to modern conditions.
Both Justices purport to follow the intention of the Framers of the
first amendment. 8 But the underlying intent of the first amendment
83 See Cass, supra note 66, at 1311 n.147. Otherjurists and first amendment commentators
have identified different purposes underlying the first amendment. See, e.g., Abrams v.
United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (to provide unrestrained
marketplace of ideas which will lead to the discovery of truth); Baker, Scope of the First Amend-
ment Freedom of Speech, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 964 (1978) (to serve as a vehicle for personal
expression and individual development); Emerson, Toward a General Theog, of the First Amend-
ment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 884 (1963) (to facilitate orderly, non-violent social change). See also
Schauer, Language, Truth, and the First Amendment: An Essay in Memor of Harry Canter, 64 VA. L.
REV. 263, 268-73 (1978).
84 See Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First Amendment, 79
HARV. L. REV. 1, 10-20 (1965).
85 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
86 Id. at 279-80. Actual malice was defined as publishing false information "with knowl-
edge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not."
87 Id. at 270. See also Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964), where the Court held that
a state could not impose criminal sanctions on people who defame public officials without
actual malice. "[W]here the criticism is of public officials and their conduct of public busi-
ness, the interest in private reputation is overborne by the larger public interest, secured by
the Constitution, in the dissemination of truth." Id. at 73.
88 Justice Brennan's concern for the framer's intent in Globe Newspaper, 102 S. Ct. at 2619,
is evident: "[We have long eschewed any 'narrow, literal conception' of the Amendment's
terms,. . . for the Framers were concerned with broad principles, and wrote against a back-
ground of shared values and practices." More narrowly, Chief Justice Burger stated, "The
Bill of Rights was enacted against the backdrop of the long history of trials being presump-
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has been very difficult to discern.8 9 The two Justices have resolved this
interpretive dilemma quite differently. Chief Justice Burger has at-
tempted to determine and carry out the specific intention of the Fram-
ers. He therefore looks to the Founding Fathers' operation of the
government; if a governmental process was open when the Framers
wrote the Constitution, the process retains a first amendment guarantee
that it will be open today.90 Justice Brennan, however, is more con-
cerned with the general intent of the Framers. He has argued that the
Court should consider the reasons the first amendment was included in
the Constitution, and extend first amendment protection to those things
which need to be protected to promote the amendment's function.9 1
It is not clear whether the Framers intended a specific or general
interpretation of the first amendment, 92 but if one believes in the need
for the first amendment to promote free and open expression, the first
amendment must go beyond what the Framers specifically intended.
Historical practice cannot adequately determine what should be open to
the public today, for in 1789 there were fewer people, no extensive gov-
ernmental bureaucracy and secret governmental information was often
exposed for partisan purposes.9 3 Because we live in a different society
today, a better framework for deciding questions regarding the public
right of access is that which the Court created in Thomhill v. Alabama:
The exigencies of the colonial period and the efforts to secure freedom
from oppressive administration developed a broadened conception of these
liberties as adequate to supply the public need for information and educa-
tion with respect to the significant issues of the times. . . . Freedom of
discussion, if it would fulfill its historic function in this nation, must em-
brace all issues about which information is needed or appropriate to en-
able the members of society to cope with the exigencies of their period.
94
Justice Brennan followed the Thornhill Court's lead by adopting a broad
view of the first amendment in order to ensure that the public will be
supplied with information it needs. Because Justice Brennan looked be-
yond historical practice in an attempt to further the goals of the first
tively open," Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 575, thus implying that the Framers' intent can
be evidenced by the historic practice.
89 See Cass, supra note 66, at 1309 & n. 142.
90 For example, prisons have not been open to the public historically, so the public has no
constitutional right of access today. See Houchins, 438 U.S. 1.
91 "The First Amendment is thus broad enough to encompass those rights that, while not
unambiguously enumerated in the very terms of the Amendment, are nonetheless necessary
to the enjoyment of other First Amendment rights." Globe Newspaper, 102 S. Ct. at 2619.
92 See generaly Perry, Interpretioism, Freedom of Expression, and Equal Protection, 42 OIo ST.
L.J. 261, 298 (1981).
93 See Comment, The Right of the Press to Gather Information after Branzburg and Pell, 124 U.
PA. L. REV. 166, 169 (1975).
94 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940).
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amendment, his approach in Globe Newspaper was superior to that em-
ployed by Chief Justice Burger.
IV. THE PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Although Globe Newspaper may have clarified the Court's position
on an important philosophical debate about the public's right of access
to criminal trials, it is unclear how the Court's adoption of Justice Bren-
nan's functional analysis will affect the actions of trial judges.
Mandatory closure statutes such as the one struck down in Globe Newspa-
per are relatively rare. The appellee Superior Court's brief identified
only two others in the country:95 Iowa's bar of the general public from
paternity trials, 96 and West Virginia's requirement that the trial of di-
vorce suits be conducted in chambers.97 While at first glance it might
appear that the Globe Newspaper decision will have little effect on the
number of criminal trials that are closed, by declaring that the public
has a constitutional right of access to all criminal trials, the Globe Newspa-
per court re-emphasized the importance open trials play in our society.
Following this case, trial court judges must be especially careful about
the restraints they place on the press and public when conducting a
criminal trial. Unfortunately, Justice Brennan did not provide any ex-
plicit guidance to help trial courts in determining when trials should be
closed, leaving it to the individual judges to decide when the interests
supporting closure outweigh the societal interest in public access.98
Trial judges have been on notice since Nebraska Press Association v.
Stuart o9 that they must look for the least restrictive means to ensure a
fair trial in order to avoid unnecessarily restricting the freedom of the
press. Nebraska Press involved a court order prohibiting the reporting of
information "strongly implicative" of an accused murderer.100 The
Supreme Court struck down the "gag order," judging it to be an uncon-
stitutional prior restraint, and held that judges cannot employ a prior
restraint unless they can demonstrate that without it, a fair trial would
be denied.10' The Court also declared that restraints on the press' right
to publish were permissible only if less restrictive alternatives would not
suffice. Alternatives suggested were the granting of a continuance, a vig-
95 See Brief for Appellee at 37 n.61, Globe Newspaper v. Superior Court, 102 S. Ct. 2613 (1982).
96 IOWA CODE ANN. § 675.20 (West 1950).
97 W. VA. CODE § 48-2-24 (1976). Seven states have statutes permitting discretionary
closure in cases involving sexual assaults. See infra note 103, 104. Nineteen states have devel-
oped non-statutory judicial rules that permit trial judges to close parts or all of trials involv-
ing sexual assaults, see inra note 105.
98 See in/fa note 102 and accompanying text.
99 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
100 Id. at 541.
10 Id. at 569.
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orous voir dire, a change of venue, sequestration of the jury or the use of
emphatic jury instructions. 0 2
Although Nebraska Press concerned a "gag order" to protect the de-
fendant from receiving prejudicial publicity, its reasoning applies
equally well to judicial attempts to protect complaining witnesses. Six
states have statutes specifically providing courts with the discretionary
power to close proceedings pertaining to sexual assaults, 10 3 and another
state has a statute which has the same effect. 10 4 Nineteen have judge-
made, non-statutory rules that grant trial judges the ability to close
parts or all of a sex-related criminal trial.10 5 But the Supreme Court has
never explained how judges should use this discretionary closure power.
In Richmond Newspapers and Globe Newspaper, the Court has held that
absent an articulated finding of an overriding interest, criminal trials
must be open to the public. Since it held that the overriding interest
must be "articulated in findings," the Richmond Newspapers court implied
that a hearing is necessary to determine whether closure is proper. 0 6 In
a subsequent footnote, however, the Court said it would not attempt to
102 Id. at 563-64.
103 ALA. CONST. art. VI, § 169; GA. CODE ANN. § 81-1006 (1956) (§ 9-10-3 under proposed
1981 Code); MIcH. COMP. LAWS § 766.9 (1968); N.Y. JUD. LAW § 433 (McKinney 1975);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-166 (Supp." 1981); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-7-4 (1953).
104 COLO. R. Civ. P. 42(c) (1970) ("All sessions of court shall be public, except that when it
appears to the court that the action will be of such character as to injure public morals, or
when orderly procedure requires [closure]. ... )
105 Hogan v. State, 191 Ark. 437, 86 S.W.2d 931 (1935); State v. Purvis, 157 Conn. 198,
251 A.2d 178 (1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 928 (1969) (but see State v. Sheppard, 7 MEDIA L.
REP. (BNA) 1140 (Conn. 1980)); Bivins v. State, 313 So.2d 471 (Fla. App. 1975); Beauchamp
v. Cahill, 297 Ky. 505, 180 S.W.2d 423 (1944); People v. Latimore, 33 Ill. App. 3d 812, 342
N.E.2d 209 (1975); Marshall v. State, 254 Ind. 156, 258 N.E.2d 628 (1970); State v. Croak,
167 La. 92, 118 So. 703 (1928); State v. Callahan, 100 Minn. 63, 110 N.W. 342 (1907); Riley
v. State, 83 Nev. 282, 429 P.2d 59 (1967); State v. Blake, 113 N.H. 115, 305 A.2d 300 (1973);
State v. Padilla, 91 N.M. 800, 581 P.2d 1295 (1978); State v. Nyhus, 19 N.D. 326, 124 N.W.
71 (1909); Commonwealth v. Stevens, 237 Pa. Super. 457, 352 A.2d 509 (1975); State v. San-
tos, 413 A.2d 58 (R.I. 1980); State v. Sinclair, 275 S.C. 608, 274 S.E.2d 411 (1981); State v.
Damm, 62 S.D. 123, 252 N.W. 7 (1933); Price v. State, 496 S.W.2d 103 (Tex. Crim. App.
1973); State v. Smith, 90 Utah 482, 62 P.2d 1110 (1936); State v. Holm, 67 Wyo. 360, 224
P.2d 500 (1950).
106 The Globe Newspaper Company's brief noted that the necessity for a hearing is re-
flected in each reported decision concerning closure of a trial after the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Richmond Newspapers. Brief for Appellant at 22 n.12. See, e.g., Sacramento Bee v.
United States Dist. Court, 656 F.2d 477 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2257 (1982); In
re United States ex rel. Pulitzer Publishing Co., 635 F.2d 676 (8th Cir. 1980); In re P.R., 7
MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 2277 (Colo. 1981); State v. Sheppard, 7 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 1140
(Conn. 1980); United States v. Edwards, 7 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 1324 (D.C. Cir. 1981);
State v. Green, 395 So. 2d 532 (Fla. 1981); People v. March, 95 Ill. App. 3d 46, 419 N.E.2d
1212 (1981); Ashland Publishing Co. v. Asbury, 612 S.W.2d 749 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980); Patux-
ent Publishing Corp. v. State, 48 Md. App. 689, 429 A.2d 554 (1981); Detroit Free Press v.
Recorder's Court Judge, 409 Mich. 364, 294 N.W.2d 827 (1980); State v. Sinclair, 275 S.C.
608, 274 S.E.2d 411 (1981); State v. Wahle, 298 N.W.2d 795 (S.D. 1980).
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define the circumstances in which all or part of a criminal trial may be
closed, but that the right of access was not absolute. The trial judge
may impose reasonable limitations on access to a trial.107
The Supreme Court in Globe Newspaper was similarly frugal in giv-
ing advice on trial closure. It provided several factors which should be
considered: the minor victim's age, psychological maturity and under-
standing, the nature of the crime, the desires of the victim and the inter-
est of the parents and relatives. 10 8 What the Court did not indicate,
however, was how much weight each of these factors should be given.
Appellate and trial court judges from various jurisdictions have
placed different weights on these factors. For example, in United States
ex. rel Latimore v. SielaJff,10 9 the court affirmed the clearing of spectators
from the courtroom during the testimony of the complaining witness in
a rape trial. The court explained the trial court's action by stating that
the main purpose of closing the trial is the protection of the personal
dignity of the complaining witness. 10 On the other hand, in Lexington
HearldLeader Co. v. Tackett,II' the Supreme Court of Kentucky held that
the press and public cannot be excluded from the courtroom merely to
save the witness from the embarrassment and emotional trauma that
testifying in open court would cause. 112
Not only have courts disagreed on what constitutes sufficient cause
to close a trial, but they also differ in deciding whom should be ex-
cluded. While some closure orders exclude everyone but the court at-
tendants and the attorneys, 113 many judges have attempted to
accomodate both the victim and the press by excluding only the public
but not the press. In Geise v. United States, 1 4 a case which involved a
nine-year-old complaining witness, the court held that excluding all
spectators except relatives and close friends of the defendant, and mem-
bers of the press and bar was a proper exercise of the trial judge's
discretion. 115
107 Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 581 n.18.
108 Globe Newspaper, 102 S. Ct. at 2621.
109 561 F.2d 691 (7th Cir. 1977).
11o Id. at 694.
111 601 S.W.2d 905 (Ky. 1980).
112 Id. at 907.
113 See, e.g., Price v. State, 496 S.W.2d 103, 107-08 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
114 262 F.2d 151 (9th Cir. 1958).
115 See also United States v. Latimore, 561 F.2d 691 (7th Cir. 1977), cert denied, 434 U.S.
1076 (1978); Douglas v. State, 328 So. 2d 18 (Fla.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 871 (1976).
Allowing the press but not the general public to be admitted to the courtroom conflicts
with the Supreme Court's well-established holding that the press may not be granted rights
which are unavailable to the general public. See, e.g., Nixon v. Warner Communications,
435 U.S. 589, 609 (1978) (the first amendment grants the press no right to trial information
superior to that of the general public). The court in Lexington Herald Leader, had a better
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V. CONCLUSION
In Globe Newspaper, the Supreme Court re-emphasized the impor-
tance of the openness of criminal trials. The decision extends the hold-
ing of Richmond Newspapers, where the Court initially recognized a first
amendment right of access to criminal trials, but limited the right to
trials "traditionally open to the public." In Globe Newspaper, a majority
of Justices adopted Justice Brennan's functional analysis of the first
amendment, agreeing that the first amendment goes farther than merely
protecting a right of public access to places consistently open in the past.
The Court held that the first amendment embraces a right of access to
criminal trials in order to ensure an informed discussion of governmen-
tal affairs. Although it is doubtful the Supreme Court will be willing to
extend the right of access to all governmental procedings which would
further an informed public discussion of governmental affairs, Globe
Newspaper signifies that the Court will recognize a broader right of ac-
suggestion on how to minimize the harm to the victim while still protecting the freedom of
the press. It held that a court should accommodate the media, since the press has a superior
ability to disseminate information, and allow only limited attendance by the public. 601
S.W.2d at 907.
Further disagreement concerning access to criminal trials has surfaced when the media
has sued for access to recorded evidence presented at trial. In Belo Broadcasting Corp. v.
Clark, 654 F.2d 423 (5th Cir. 1981), broadcasters filed requests to copy audio tapes of discus-
sions between defendants allegedly taking bribes from FBI agents. The Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals held there is no first amendment right to access to the tapes; broadcasters simply had
to be content with transcripts of the conversations. For support, the court cited Warner Com-
munications, in which the Supreme Court rejected a similar claim of a constitutional right of
access to trial exhibits: "[w]e have carefully considered the argument that Richmond Newspa-
pers has altered the firm 'no constitutional right of access' holding of Warner Communications
and thus breathed new life into the broadcasters' claim of first amendment entitlement to
copy and broadcast these tapes. We find it unpersuasive." Id. at 427.
On the other hand, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals was persuaded by a similar
argument in United States v. Criden, 648 F.2d 814 (3rd Cir. 1981). The court reversed a
decision refusing to allow NBC to copy video and audio tapes admitted into evidence during
a criminal trial. Although the court disposed of the case on non-constitutional grounds, it
stated:
We need not speculate on whether the Richmond Newspapers case betokens a more expan-
sive view of the First Amendment's application to the right to copy evidence introduced
at trial than was followed by the Court in Warner Communications two years before, but we
believe the analyses in Richmond Newspapers of the public's right to an open trial provide
strong support for reliance on the common law right of access to trial materials in this
case.
Id. at 821-22.
The Criden court seems to have been correct in light of Globe Newspaper. Allowing broad-
casters to have the right to copy tapes in order to show them to the public would promote the
functioning of the first amendment because the general public no longer attends trials, but
rather acquires information through the media. Allowing broadcasters access to the tapes
would, therefore, further the cause of an informed citizenry.
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cess to information which the public needs in order to make intelligent
electoral decisions.
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